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Abstract 
This  paper estimates the relationships between market  structure and 
the Lerner  index  of  monopoly  constructed  from  price data on  processed  food 
products  sold through grocery  stores.  A  theoretical model  of  a  differ-
entiated oligopoly specifies two  determinants of  price-cost margins:  the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman  index  of seller concentration adjusted  for the elas-
ticity of  demand  and the  industry advertising-to-sales ratio.  The  results 
indicate that the three principal determinants  of price-cost margin varia-
tion,  in order of their  impacts,  are:  advertising intensity,  elasticity of 
demand,  and  concentration.  Previous  structure-performance studies that did 
not  incorporate the elasticity of  demand  were  probably misspecified. I.  Background 
An  interesting feature  of manufactured  food  markets  is the existence 
of parallel distribution channels  for  advertised manufacturers'  brands  and 
comparable private-label products.  For  most  foods  and  beverages,  super-
markets  stock  leading national or  regional  brands  as well  as  its own  store 
label  in  an  adjacent  shelf  location.  Private-label production of  foods  is 
substantial;  measured  in manufacturers'  prices,  private-label products 
accounted  for  34%  of the  1977  value of  shipments  of  consumer  food  manufac~ 
tures1  [connor  1982:Table 3].  The  remaining  66%  of  consumer  foods  were 
shipped with the manufacturer's  label;  we  call this the  "national brand" 
channel. 
Although the national  brand  and  private label  food  channels  are  joined 
at the retail level,  at the manufacturing  level the two  submarkets  are dis-
tinct.  In analytically significant ways,  the  two  submarkets  have  different 
market  structure characteristics that result  in markedly different strate-
gic  groups.  The  industries ,that manufacture  national  brands  of  foods  are 
characterized by  high  levels of  sales concentration and  product differen-
tiation.  For  example,  in  1980-81  the  four  leading national-brand manufac-
turers  accounted  for  an  average  of  85%  of  U.S.  retail sales of  branded  food 
products  in  36  selected product  classes,  and  none  was  less than  60% 
[Connor,  et al.  1985:222].  Moreover,  advertising and  other selling 
expenses  of  leading  food  manufacturers  averaged  13%  of  sales  in the mid-
1970s,  twice the  level of all manufacturers  [ibid.:90].  The  conduct  of 
national-brand manufacturers  is characterized by  posted pricing  and  many 
nonprice  strategies associated with  imperfect  competition  [ibid.:218-23]. 
Private-label  food  manufacturers,  on  the  other  hand,  operate  in 
markets  that  have  structural configurations that  encourage vigorous price 
competition.2  The  market  shares  of  private-label manufacturers  are gener-
ally small.  Among  all U.S.  warehoused  food  and  beverage products  in '1980, 
private-label products  accounted  for  40%  or more  of retail sales  in only  39 
of  378  product  categories  [ibid.:77].  More  importantly,  product differen-
tiation is practically absent;  private-label manufacturers  have  no 2 
incentive to advertise to consumers.  Also,  the minuscule selling effort on 
private-label products  is provided  by  retailers in  local  newspapers,  a  form 
that emphasizes  low  price.  Quality differences  between retailers'  first-
line private labels  and  national brands  as  a  group  are minimal  [Scherer  and 
Ross  1990:581-82).  The  technology of production has  relatively small 
optimal  scale  and  tends  to be  more  standardized  for  categories  in which 
private-label products  are  common.  Finally,  private-label manufacturers 
sell to retailers in  large quantities under  conditions of  continuous price 
negotiations with professional retail buyers  who  are well  informed  about 
product quality and  availability.  For all these reasons,  private-label 
prices are believed to  approximate  competitive prices of  comparable 
national brands. 
If one  accepts these arguments,  then it is possible to construct the 
Lerner  (1934)  index  of monopoly  directly  from  price data.  The  Lerner  index 
is  (Pm  - Pc)/Pm,  where  Pm  is the observed market  price charged by  a  non-
discriminating monopolist  (or  a  collusive group of oligopolists)  and  Pc  is 
the competitive market  price.  This  index  can  also  be  applied to the 
performance  outcomes  of  a  wide  range  of  noncollusive oligopoly models 
[Scherer  and  Ross  1990:  Chapter  6).  The  particular price-cost margin  (PCM) 
employed  here is  (NB  - PL)/NB,  where  NB  is the observed retail price of 
"national brands"  of processed  foods  and  beverages,  and  PL  is the price of 
equivalent  "private  label"  products.3  This  PCM  is  a  reasonable  approx-
imation of  the Lerner  index  so  long  as  market  demand  is downward  sloping, 
X-inefficiency due  to market  power  is absent  or  is equiproportional  across 
industries,  and  the monopolist  or collusive group  actually exercise their 
market  power  through pricing conduct.  This particular  index  was  previously 
employed  by  Parker  and  Connor  (1979)  and  Nickell  and  Metcalf  (1978). 
The  purpose of this paper  is to determine  the relationship between 
market  structure  and  the pricing performance  of  branded manufactured  food 
products using the  national brand-private  label price difference as  an 
approximation to the Lerner  index.  A  theoretical model  is adopted that specifies two  elements of market  structure:  the Herfindahl  index of 
concentration adjusted for elasticity of  demand  and  industry advertising 
intensity.  Previous  researchers  have  been  concerned  about  the omission of 
demand elasticities in empirical  market  structure-performance studies.4 
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In our model,  the own-price elasticity of  demand  is specified endogenously. 
This  paper  also addresses  two  measurement  issues that arise when  the data 
set used to construct price differences  is  from  a  highly disaggregated, 
commercial  price reporting source.  Finally,  we  implement  some  modest 
improvements  in the measurement  of  concentration and  advertising. 
II.  Theoretical  Model 
Following  Cowling  and  Waterson  (1976)  and  Nickell  and  Metcalf  [1978], 
consider  an  industry with  n  profit-maximizing  firms  that produce  similar 
but  not  identical products  under  conditions of  varying marginal  costs  (Cj). 
Each  firm's  product  is differentiated in the  sense that there may  exist 
price differentials between different  firms'  products.  However,  consumers 
perceive these goods  as  broad  substitutes,  so  an  increase  in production by 
one  firm will  reduce  the prices of all  firms  in the market.  We  assume that 
by  increasing unit advertising expenditures  (ai)'  a  firm  can  increase the 
price  (Pj)  of its product relative to  industry  average price  (p).  From the 
first-order conditions of  a  Cournot  equilibrium,  aggregated to the market 
level,  one  can derive  [Connor  and  Peterson  1991:  Appendix  A]  the  following 
equation: 
(1 )  H  +  a 
W  p 
where  c  is average  industry marginal  cost  and  a  is  industry advertising 
expenditure  for  the  average  firm.  The  left-hand side of  equation  (1)  is an 
industry price-cost margin.  The  right-hand  side  shows  that the margin  is 
positively related to the Herfindahl-Hirshman  index  H,  inversely related to 
the absolute value of the own-price elasticity of  demand  Ed'  and  positively 
related to the  industry average  advertising-to-sales ratio  (alp).  While our theoretical model  posits that  high  advertising intensity increases the 
difference between  national-brand  and  private-label prices,  the mechanism 
behind this association is subject to several  interpretations that are 
discussed  in section V  below. 
III.  Empirical  Model 
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Equation  (1)  is  a  testable model  that relates the degree  of market 
power  to market  structure in an  industry where  firms  maximize profits under 
conditions of differentiated oligopoly.  The  model  provides  a  theoretical 
justification for  using  industry aggregate data.  Moreover,  it also speci-
fies  a  particular concentration measure  (H)  and  justifies the  inclusion of 
Ed  as  an  adjustment  on  concentration rather than  as  an  exogenous  factor. 
However,  several  further  adjustments  need  to  be  made  to aggregate  industry 
concentration and  advertising before empirical testing can  proceed. 
First,  corrections  need  to  be  made  because  available  industry concen-
tration data are national  in scope,  whereas  many  food  manufacturing markets 
are  subnational.  A  variable measuring  the geographic  dispersion of  produc-
tion  (GEOG)  is included to correct  for  understatement  in the national 
concentration  indexes.  GEOG  is constructed by  taking the  regional differ-
ences  between the percentage of  production  and  percentage of population  and 
summing  the absolute differences.  When  GEOG  is  low,  H  is understated,  but 
when  GEOG  is high,  H  is correctly measured.  In our model  formulation,  the 
uncorrected concentration  index  is interacted multiplicatively with 
geographic  dispersion to create  H  *  GEOG  (see  Scherer  and  Ross  1990:424). 
Thus,  H  *  GEOG  is expected to  be  inversely related to national  brand-
private label price margins. 
Second,  when  consumers  are  supplied partly by  imports,  market  shares 
calculated  from  domestic  shipments  are overestimated,  whereas  net exports 
tend to have  the opposite effect.  Thus,  net  imports  divided  by  industry 
output  also corrects  for  overstatement  of published national  concentration 
indexes  and,  likewise,  the relationship of  H  *  IMP  to the  PCM  should  be 
negative. 5 
A  third adjustment  on  published concentration ratios is an  attempt to 
reduce the inevitable understatement  due  to noncompeting  product  subgroups 
within  an  SIC  product  class.  Most  food  product  classes contain mixtures of 
products  sold to  farmers,  to other manufacturers,  to the  food service  indus-
try,  and  to  food  stores.  We  have  attempted to mitigate this measurement 
error by  using the  narrower  five-digit  product  class definitions  and  by 
including only predominantly  consumer-product  classes.  However,  even the 
most  consumer-oriented  food  industries contain  foodservice  and  producer 
goods;  in breakfast cereals,  for  example,  significant  shipments  of puffed 
rice are sold  as  ingredients  for  the  candy  industry  [Connor,  et ale 
1985:59).  Therefore,  the percentage of  shipments  destined  for  food  stores 
(FS)  is interacted with  H.  When  FS  is  100  percent,  H  is correctly mea-
sured.  However,  but  when  FS  is  low  and  concentration within the  food  store 
segment  is not  much  lower  than the other  segments,  H  is understated.  As 
these two  conditions are rarely observed,  the resulting variable  (H  *  FS) 
is expected to  have  a  negative  relationship with our  measures  of  PCM. 
Two  variables  capturing the  influence of  advertising are  included in 
our  model.  Because  our  PCM  is restricted to  consumer  food  products 
distributed through grocery stores,  it seems  appropriate to relate adver-
tising expenditures to  a  similarly narrow  concept of  sales.  Most  previous 
research  has  divided  advertising expenditures  by total  industry  shipments. 
However,  advertising by  food  manufacturers  is directed almost  solely toward 
branded  products  sold  in grocery stores.  The  denominator  of the 
advertising-to-sales ratio  (ADBFS)  uses  sales estimates of  branded  foods 
sold  in  food  stores only.  Thus,  the denominator  eliminates  shipments  of 
producer  goods,  food  for  the  away-from-home  trade,  foods  that are 
unbranded,  and  net  exports.  In  addition,  we  attempt to account  for varia-
tions  in the mix  of media  employed.  Porter  (1976)  has  argued that elec-
tronic mass  media  are more  effective than print media  in creating consumer 
loyalty.  The  ratio 'of  network television to total advertising expenditures 
(TVAD)  is used to capture the degree  of  "image"  or  "persuasive"  content  in advertising messages.  Thus,  both  ADBFS  and  TVAD  should  have  positive 
impacts  on  the national brand-private label price margins.S  Finally,  our 
model  includes  a  variable for  growth  in  shipments  (GR07782)  in order to 
control  for transitory  (nonstructural)  sources of variation in price-cost 
margins. 
(2 ) 
In  summary,  the model  that is to  be  empirically estimated is: 
PCM = 13 0  +  13 1 (H/ IEdl)  +  13 2ADBFS +  13 3 TVAD  +  ~4 (H* GEOG) 
+  135 (H* IMP)  +  B6  (H* FS)  +  137GR077 82  +  e I 
where: 
PCM  =  national brand-private label price margin  and 
e  =  error term. 
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Note  that equation  (2)  does  not  contain  a  control variable for the 
capital/sales ratio.  As  is well  known,  under  competitive conditions the 
PCM  should,  in the  long  run"  be  equal  to the  required rental rate on  assets 
employed  per dollar of  sales  [Schmalensee  1989:960-61].  However,  because 
our measure  of  costs is the selling price of direct rival  firms,  such price 
data already  include the costs of  capital.  To  the extent that private-
label producers  face  the  same  risk as  their national-brand counterparts, 
controlling for  variation in interindustry risk is also unnecessary. 
IV.  Data  Sources  and  Measurement  Problems 
This  study utilizes three similar dependent  variables  (PCM79,  PCM80, 
and  PCM7980)  to  examine  the relationships  between  market  structure and 
national brand-private label price margins.  The  dependent  variables were 
constructed  from  finely matched  item-level observations  (e.g.,  8-ounce 
cans,  low calorie,  chocolate-flavored topping)  of retail prices reported by 
the Nielsen Early  Intelligence System  (NEIS)  for April  and  May  of  1979  and 
1980.6  This  data  system  has  many  admirable  features  for  price analyses  of 
many  kinds,  including representative national  sample  coverage  of  bimonthly 
transaction prices  and  sales of  more  than  50,000  warehoused  grocery 
items.7 7 
A  "matching  problem"  occurs  because  our units of  observation  (five-
digit SIC  product  classes)  are typically more  broadly defined  than the  NElS 
product  categories.  There  were  about  100  SICs  of predominantly consumer 
food  product classes  in  1977,  whereas  the  NElS  classified retail product 
prices  into approximately  320  food  and  beverage  categories  [Connor  and 
Peterson  1991:  Appendix  Tables  2  and  3).  Some  of these product  classes 
contain industrial  food  ingredients or  nonwarehoused  foods,  which  lie 
outside the  scope  of the  NElS.  Therefore,  some  of the calculated price 
margins  are not  representative of the market  structure variables in the 
sense that there  is not  a  complete  correspondence  between the two.  How-
ever,  in this study,  each of the  1979  price margins  (PCM79)  was  constructed 
to have  at least  a  50%  coverage to the corresponding  SIC  product class. 
(Another  related matching difficulty was  initial uncertainty about  the 
proper  SIC  category  into which  a  few  NElS  categories  should  be  placed.) 
For  PCM79,  product  class price differences  were  calculated  for  1,043  item 
prices  in  153  NElS  product  categories.  Thus,  the  PCM79  data are fairly 
representative of the  SIC  definitions used  for  the  independent variables. 
A  second  concern  about  this  PCM  is possible differences  in quality 
between  national  brands  and  private label products.  Is it reasonable to 
compare  the prices of  national-brand products  with  the prices of all 
private-label products  in the  same  product  category?  There  are arguments 
on  both sides of this  issue.  The  specificity of most  NElS  categories 
(e.g.,  canned  asparagus)  and  private-label  procurement  practices  [Hamm 
1981)  do  much  to minimize  quality differences.  Numerous,  authoritative, 
but  dated  studies  have  concluded that  average quality differences  between 
national  brands  and  first-line private-label products  are negligible.  A 
careful  review of  several  such  studies  found  that  " . .. distributors'  and 
manufacturers'  brands  are essentially equal  in quality"  [Applebaum  and 
Goldberg  1967,  p .  47).  On  the other  hand,  there are  some  categories that 
do  contain national brand  items  that are only partially matched  by  equiv-
alent private-label  items.  If the  unique  national  brand  items  are  newer, higher  value  added  items,  the calculated price difference will  be 
exaggerated.  This  is especially problematic given  evidence that  new 
product  introductions  are systematically related to markets  characterized 
by  differentiated oligopoly  [Connor  1981)~  Moreover,  Wills  (1984)  found 
that  1980  NElS  prices of  branded  processed  foods  were  significantly and 
positively related to ratings of quality by  blind consumer taste panels. 
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To  address this concern,  the price margins  for  1980  (PCM80)  were 
constructed to try to eliminate those categories  judged to contain private-
label products with significant quality differences  compared to the 
national  brands  in that category  [see Wills  1983).  PCM80  was  assembled 
from  about  1,400 grocery-item prices  spanning  145  NElS  categories.  PCM79 
and  PCM80  are highly correlated. 
Finally,  we  created  a  third dependent  variable  (PCM7980)  that averages 
the price-cost margins  across the  two  years  of  data.  This  averaging 
procedure  should  help bring out  long-term structural determinants  more 
clearly and  is akin to the multi-year  averaging  recommended  in the  case of 
accounting profits.  Moreover,  because  PCM7980  was  constructed for  only 
those product  classes  for  which  both  PCM79  and  PCM80  were  available,  the 
PCM7980  sample  has  the additional  advantage  of  addressing both the matching 
problem  and  the quality heterogeneity problem  simultaneously.  For  both 
these reasons,  we  expect  models  based  on  PCM7980  to exhibit superior good-
ness  of fit compared to the single-year price-cost margins. 
The  Herfindahl-Hirschman  index  of  concentration  (H)  was  first 
published  by  the u.S.  Bureau  of  the  Census  (1986)  for  the year  1982.  The 
value of  H  was  used  in its ratio  form  such  that monopoly  is represented by 
H  equal to one  and  atomism  by  H  approaching  zero.  The  Herfindahl-Hirschman 
index  is adjusted  for  the degree  of  demand  responsiveness  by  dividing by 
IEdl,  the absolute value of  the own-price elasticity of  demand.8  These 
elasticities have  the  advantage  of  being measured  at the manufacturing 
level  (rather than the usual  household  level). The  degree  of  product differentiation is modeled  by  two  variables: 
ADBFS,  the  1977  six-media advertising expenditures  for all brands  in the 
product class divided by  1977  shipments  of  branded products  sold  in  food 
stores  [Connor  1982)  and  TVAD,  the ratio of  network television to total 
six-media advertising expenditures  in  1977,  expressed as  percentages 
[Parker  and  Connor  1979).  The  variable GR07782  is the  five  year  (1977-
1982)  growth  rates  in the value of  shipments  from  the u.s.  Census  of 
Manufactures. 
V.  Results 
Equation  (2)  was  estimated using  an  ordinary least  squares  (OLS) 
procedure  for  each of the dependent  variables.  The  results  for  each equa-
tion are given  in Table  I.  All  coefficients are significant  (at  10%  or 
better)  and  have  the expected signs.  The  coefficient of the Herfindahl-
Hirschman  index  of  concentration adjusted  for  the own-price elasticity of 
demand  is positive  and  significant at the  1%  level  in all models.9  As  the 
level  of  concentration  increases or  as  the own-price elasticity of  demand 
decreases  (i.e.,  demand  becomes  more  inelastic),  the price margin  between 
national  brands  and  private  label  products  increases.  The  significance of 
HIEd  is surprising in light of  several  studies of  u.s.  manufacturing that 
found  that the concentration-profitability relationship essentially 
vanished during the  inflationary period of  the  1970s  [Schmalensee 
1989:975). 
[Table  I] 
9 
The  two  variables  representing  product differentiation are both 
positive  and  highly significant  in all equations. 10  For  a  one  percent 
increase  in  ADBFS,  the  national  brand-private label price difference widens 
by  about  two  percentage points.  Also,  in markets  where  half the  adver-
tising of  processed  foods  is on  network television,  the price margin  is 
about  5  percentage points higher  than  when  none  is used.  The  appropriate 
test for  significance of  ADBFS  requires  some  attention.  The t-statistics 
reported  for  ~2'  the  regression coefficients of  ADBFS  in Table  I,  are based 10 
on  the alternative hypothesis that the coefficient is strictly greater than 
zero.  Because private-label manufacturers  do  not  advertise,  the  PCM 
includes the. costs of advertising  by  national  brand manufacturers.  Hence, 
the appropriate critical value of  32  would  be. unity  (Scherer  and  Ross 
1990:436].  Under this more  stringent test,  ADBFS  is still significantly 
different  from  one. 
The  strong  findings  of the effect of  advertising on price-cost margins 
are open to varying  interpretations.  The  influential work  of  Comanor  and 
Wilson  (1974]  that hypothesized that advertising intensity represents 
Bainsian barriers to entry is certainly consistent with the spirit of our 
theoretical model.  An  alternative,  but  equally consistent  interpretation 
is  a  generalization of the Dorfman-Steiner  (1954]  theorem.  Whether  a 
joint-profit-maximizing group,  a  Cournot-Nash  oligopoly,  or  oligopoly with 
retaliation among  rivals,  advertising intensity is positively related to 
achieved price-cost margins  (Scherer  and  Ross  1990:592-95].  To  the extent 
that observed  advertising intensities contain  some  introductory adver-
tising,  a  number  of theoretical  models  that  show that pioneering brands 
give permanent  first-mover  advantages  to later entrants may  be  relevant 
(Schmalensee  1986:387-92].  In brief,  first movers  may  use  image  adver-
tising or real physical differentiation as  the basis  for  high price-cost 
margins,  which  in turn will  encourage  more  intensive advertising. 
The  national-brand products  in our  sample  are  nearly all  "experience" 
goods  sold through self-service retailers  in small  unit values.  Such  goods 
are  not  only prime  candidates  for  first-mover  advantages,  but  also,  accord-
ing to Nelson's  (1974]  informal  model,  the  kind  that prompt  manufacturers 
to signal  high quality with  high  (even  purely persuasive)  advertising 
intensity.  If Nelson's  hypothesis  is true,  then  the positive association 
of advertising intensity with prices  could  be  due  to the  fact  that adver-
tising signals quality differences.  Evidence  presented  by  Wills  (1984]  on 
about  50  processed  food  products  shows  that the  upward  bias  in the 
advertising-price relationship due  to quality differences  is at most  10%. 11 
However,  even  though prices may  be  weakly  related to product quality,  one 
may  reasonably expect unit  costs to rise with quality as well.  Thus, 
Nelson's theory provides  no  expectation  concerning the effect of advertis-
ing intensity on  price-cost margins. 
The  three control  variables  included  in the model  to adjust published 
concentration data all behave  as  anticipated.  Import  competition is not 
terribly important  for  most  u.s.  food  manufacturing  industries.  For  our 
samples,  net  imports  average only  2.5%  to  3.0%  of domestic  supply,  but it 
should be  noted that the categories with the highest  degree  of penetration 
(beef,  alcoholic beverages)  are out  of  sample.  Nevertheless,  H  *  IMP 
displays the expected  negative  sign  in the  two  models  containing  1980  price 
data. 
Second,  the variable that captures the understatement  inherent  in 
published national  concentration ratios when  regional  markets  are present 
(H  *  GEOG)  has  the expected ·negative coefficient.  The  large  number  of 
subnational markets  in  food  manufacturing  makes  correction of published 
concentration data  imperative.  Previous  researchers  have  either corrected 
the concentration  index directly  (which  is not  feasible  for  the Herfindahl 
index)  or  indirectly by  including  some  measure  of  geographic  extent of 
markets  as  an  additional variable. II 
Third,  we  tried to correct  for  understatement  in published  H  values 
due to noncompeting  product  subgroups  by  including the variable  H  *  FS. 
However,  H  *  FS  consistently displayed  an  unexpected positive sign  in all 
models.  The  positive sign is puzzling.  Most  of  the variation in H  *  FS  is 
due to variation in  FS  rather than  H.  We  can  only  speculate after the  fact 
that  FS  is serving  as  a  proxy  for  the  well-known  consumer  good/producer 
good distinction that has  so  often proven  significant  in market  structure-
performance  studies.  We  had  expected that  sampling  procedures  and  the 
ADBFS  and  TVAD  variables  would  have  captured most  of the  consumer/producer 
variation.  Perhaps,  for  a  given  level  of  seller concentration,  a  low  FS signals more  effective bargaining strength  (i.e.,  lower seller margins) 
among  industrial  and  foodservice  buyers than  among  food  store  o~erators. 
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The  fourth  and  final  control variable is 1977-1982  shipments  growth  in 
the relevant product  classes  (GR07782).  Growth  has  the anticipated posi-
tive  impact  on  margins  only  in  1979.  Although  a  positive coefficient is  a 
very  common  finding  in studies of  U.S.  manufacturing  [Schmalensee 
1989:972),  growth  was  not  significant in eight  previous  studies of profit-
ability or Census  PCMs  among  the  food  manufacturing  industries  [Connor, 
et al.  1985:335-4~).  One  can  only  speculate as to the  reasons  for  the poor 
showing" for  growth:  the relatively  low  variation in  annual  production in 
food  manufacturing,  the  choice of initial or terminal  years,  or differences 
in macroeconomic  conditions  are all possibilities. 
Differences  in the estimated coefficients between  PCM79  and  PCM80  can 
be attributed to two  factors:  (1)  differences  in the  samples  and  (2)  dif-
ferences  in the method  of  computation of the dependent  variables.  Struc-
tural data were  available  for  102  SIC  consumer  product  classes,  but only  42 
(in  1980)  or  50  (in  1979)  of these  could be  used  due  to the  limited cover-
age  of  the price data.  For the  combined  1979-1980  data,  the overlap was  39 
product  classes.  The  inclusion or exclusion of  certain SIC  categories 
could  have  had  an  impact  on the  estimated coefficients for  anyone equa-
tion. 12  Secondly,  there was  considerable variability in the methods  used 
to develop the price differences  reported  by  the  PCM79  and  PCM80  dependent 
variables.  This variability certainly could  have  caused  some  of  the vari-
ability in the estimated coefficients.  We  are  comforted  by  the  fact  that 
the  combined  1979-1980  sample  has  the closest fit of  the three regressions 
shown.  The  superior fit of the two-year  sample  may  be  attributed in part 
to the  averaging itself,  a  procedure that  should  allow structural deter-
minants  to emerge  with greater force.  However,  the closeness of fit of the 
1979-80  data also  suggests that estimated price-cost margins  from  product 
classes that minimize the matching  problem  as  well  as  avoid  heterogeneous quality classes offer the best  prospects  for  uncovering market  structure-
performance  relationships. 
VI.  Summary  and  Conclusions 
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The  regression results  reported  in this paper demonstrate  a  relation-
ship between  industry price-cost margins  and  industry concentration and 
advertising.  They  also  justify the  use of  the own-price elasticity of 
demand  as  an  adjustment  for  market  concentration.  As  the  level of market 
concentration  increases or the market elasticity of  demand  decreases,  the 
national brand-private label price margins  widen.  The  positive relation-
ship between  concentration is similar to the  findings  of previous  studies 
using price-cost margins.  However,  this paper  found  that the elasticity of 
demand  plays  a  larger role than market  concentration  in determining the 
price difference between  national brands  and  private label products  (Table 
II).  When  demand  is relatively elastic  (IEdl  0.381),  varying the concen-
tration level makes  virtually no  difference  in predicted price-cost 
margins.  However,  when  demand  is quite  inelastic  (IEdl  =  0.065),  high 
concentration  (H  0.235)  yields predicted  PCMs  about  4  percentage points 
higher than  when  H  is  low  (0.035). 
[Table  1I1 
Product differentiation plays  an  even  more  powerful  role  in determin-
ing the difference  in national  brand  and  private label prices.  comparing 
product  classes with  a  media  advertising-to-sales ratio that is one 
standard deviation below the  mean  (ADBFS  =  0.4%)  with  a  ratio one  standard 
deviation  above  the  mean  (ADBFS  =  6.0%)  results  in predicted  PCMs  that are 
approximately  12  percentage points apart.  As  mentioned  above,  the market 
power  effect of  advertising  intensity may  be  overstated by  these results. 
First,  the  PCM  is affected by  differences  in selling costs  between national 
brand manufacturers  and private-label manufacturers,  the latter performing 
virtually no  media  advertising.  If media  advertising were  perfectly posi-
tively correlated with other selling costs,  then  the estimated coefficient 
of  ADBFS  (2.21)  implies that advertising-induced profits rise 1.21%  of 14 
sales  for  each  1%  of advertising-to-sales.  However,  although media  adver-
tising and other selling costs  are significantly correlated,  the correla-
tion is not perfect  [Connor  and  Weimer  1986).  Moreover,  media  advertising 
accounts  for  only  30%  to  50%  of total selling costs  in  food  manufacturing 
[Connor,  et al.  1985).  Therefore,  the true market  power  effect of  ADBFS  on 
price-cost margins  is  a  point estimate  in the range  of  1.1 to 1.6.  In this 
case,  contrasting  low with  high  ADBFS  results  in differences  in price-cost 
margins  of  from  6.1  to 9.1  percentage points.  Even  when  demand  is highly 
inelastic,  varying advertising intensity has  a  considerably stronger effect 
on price-cost margins  than  varying  concentration  in  a  comparable manner. 
This  study  has  attempted to address  some  of  the  limitations of 
previous  research using  national  brand-private  label price margins  to 
approximate the Lerner  index,  namely,  the  "matching"  problem  and the 
effects of quality differences  between national  brands  and  private label 
products.  Despite these  improvements,  there are  a  several  limitations 
remaining  for  structure-performance tests that use  cross-sectional data on 
national brand-private label price margins.  First,  coverage  is limited to 
warehoused  grocery products that  have  comparable private label offerings 
(about  45  percent of  food  and  beverage  sales  in grocery stores).  For  most 
fresh  meat  and  produce  items,  there are  no  national  brands.  Also,  the 
warehouse-withdrawal  system does  not  record  shipments  of  grocery products 
that are delivered to stores  by  manufacturers  or specialty wholesalers. 
However,  recently  introduced  systems  using electronic check-out . data  can 
provide  such  data.  Second,  in order to  ensure  that the matching  problems 
have  been  eliminated,  market  structure measures  would  have  to be  developed 
for  the generally finer  NEIS  categories  instead of  the broader  SIC 
categories.  Developing  NEIS-based  Herfindahl  indexes  and  advertising 
expenditures  appears  feasible  [Connor  1988:375-80). 
Perhaps the most  serious  limitation is that the price margins  used  in 
this paper are retail-level price differences.  Therefore,  the margins 
include the gross margins  of  national  brand manufacturers,  wholesalers  and 15 
retailers.  If distributors'  margins  are equiproportional  across  product 
classes,  or if they are positively correlated with manufacturers'  margins, 
our  results remain valid.  Limited  evidence  from  the  food  industry supports 
the  view that gross  margins  of  food  manufacturers  are  significantly 
positively correlated with the mark-ups  of  grocery wholesalers  and grocery 
retailers  [Connor  and  Weimer  1986].  Within  product  categories,  most 
evidence  suggests that grocery retailers place higher retail margins  on 
their private-label products  than  on  the  comparable  national brands  [Albion 
1983].  If this is true,  using retail prices may  have  biased downward  our 
results  for manufacturer  concentration  and  advertising.  A  more  direct test 
would  involve using price margins  at or  near  the manufacturer  level. 13 Table I.  Regression Results Explaining National Brand-Private Label Price Differences Among Manufactured Foods, 
1979 and  1980. 
Deoendent Variables 
Independent Variables 
and General Statistics  PCM79  PCM80  PCM7980 
Equation 1.1  Equation 1.2  Equation 1.3 
Estimated Coefficients (t-statistics) 
Intercept  -I'{i?  J:8na  7.344
R 
(-0.2  .42)  (3 .on 
Concentration  (HIIEdl)  1.305a  1.473a  1.44lb 
(4.3 n  (2.74)  (2.42) 
Advertising intensity: 
ADBFSd  2.288a  1.88~  2 .20~ 
(5.61)  (6.07)  (6.70) 
TVAD  0.099"  0.121b  O.I09b 
((.41)  (2.14)  (1.73) 
Adjustments on concentration: 
Net imports (H·IMP)  - -0.748b  -0.502" 
(-2.25)  (-1.45) 
Regional markets (H·GEOG)  -0.608"  -0.462"  -O.48~ 
(-2.86)  (-2.71)  (-2.74) 
Consumer products (H·FS)  0.515"  0.304b  0.391a 
(3 .96)  (2.45}  (J.03} 
Growth (GR07782)  0.067"  - -
I  (1 .96) 
Corrected coefficient of detennination (R2) 
0.51  0.56  0.62 
F-test  8.61a  8.61a  10.loa 
No. of observations  45  37  34 
d  =  significance from  I at the I % level; calculated t-values are 3.16, 2.85, 3.66. 
Note:  Numbers in parentheses are t statistics.  Superscripts a,  b, and c represent statistical significance from zero at the 1%,5%, 
and  10% levels, respectively.  Except for GR07782, one-tailed tests are used. 
Table II.  Predicted 1979-1980 Price-Cost Margins for  Processed Food Products Under Alternative Structural Configurations. 
Relate:l Indastic Demand 
Enl  = 0.065 
Relativ~lr Elastic  Demand 
E  = 0 . 381 
Industry Advertising 
Intensity (ADBFS)  Concentration (} n  Concentration t1-) 
Low  Average  High  Low  Average  High 
(0.035)  (0. 135)  (0.235)  (0.035)  (0.135)  (0.235) 
Percent 
Low (0.40%)  13.6  15.9  18.1  13.0  13.4  13.8 
Averal!e (3 .19%)  19.8  22.0  24.2  19.2  19.5  19.9 
Hil!h (5.97%)  25.9  28.2  30.4  25.3  25.7  26.1 
Note:  Point estimates of PCM7980 are predicted from  Equation 1.3 in Table I holding all  independent variables other than 
HIIEdl  and ADBFS at their means (see Appendix Table 8).  "Low" structural levels are one standard deviation below the 
mean, whereas "high" levels are one standard deviation above. 16 
Footnotes 
Food  stores are  not  unique  in offering private-label equivalents. 
Clothing  and  drug  stores also  have  private-label programs.  However, 
grocery stores are  probably  unique  in having private-label alternatives 
for  nearly all branded products. 
2  Private-label  food  manufacturing  by  national-brand  firms  is rare 
[Connor,  et al.  1985:220-223].  Thus,  the  firms  (or their divisions) 
that sell manufacturers'  brands  are different  from  those that pack 
private-label  items. 
3  Most  previous market  structure-performance studies  have  calculated 
price-cost margins  from  census  data that aggregate establishment ship-
ments  and  variable costs across  four-digit  SIC  industries.  While 
incorporating many  advantages  over  accounting profits data,  this  PCM 
may  be distorted by  multiple-product  establishments,  inter-industry 
variation in depreciation rates,  and  overly broad  market  definitions 
[Schmalensee  1989:960-62]. 
By  "national brands",  we  mean  brands  owned  by  the manufacturers, 
whether  the  brand  is distributed nationally or,  as  is often the  case, 
regionally.  "Private  labels"  are  brands  owned  by  grocery retailers 
(also called  "store brands")  or grocery wholesalers  (also called 
"controlled brands"). 
4  Developments  in the theory of  barriers to entry by  Bain  [1956],  Sylos-
Labini  [1962],  and  Bhagwati  [1970]  suggest that the entry-deterring 
price is positively related to the  inelasticity of  demand.  In  an  early 
theoretical treatment,  Johnson  and  Helmberger  [1976]  showed  that  a 
given price  increase  in  an  industry with  a  homogeneous  product  and 
Cournot  behavior  has  relatively larger effects on  economic  profit than 
when  demand  is' relatively elastic. 
5  TVAD  is unrelated to the  industry advertising-to-sales ratio alp, 
unless significant pecuniary  economies  exist in the  purchase of  TV 9 
advertising.  The  simple correlation coefficient between the  TVAD  and 
ADBFS  in our  sample is -0.15. 
17 
6  Of  course,  manufacturers'  prices would  be  preferred,  but  these are not 
available.  Unexplained  variance  may  be  attributed to distributors' 
margins,  differences  in quality between  national  and  private-label 
brands,  measurement  errors,  and  experimental errors.  Therefore,  only 
that portion of  the variation in  PCM  that is attributable to variation 
in manufacturers'  market  structure and  conduct  can  be  interpreted as  an 
outcome  of  the exercise of market  power  by  food  processors. 
7  Parker  and  Connor  [1979]  used  a  similar,  but  more  aggregated,  data 
source  from  selling Areas-Marketing,  Inc.  (SAMI),  which  approached 
being  a  monthly  census  of  grocery  products. 
8  For the definitions  and  sources  of  the  independent variables,  see 
Appendix  B  of  Connor  and  Peterson  [1991].  Five  product  classes  in SIC 
2099  could not  be  included because  the own-price elasticity of  demand 
was  not  calculated for this  NEC  industry.  The  mean  elasticity values 
from  Pagoulatos  and  Sorenson  [1986]  were  used  in this study. 
In order to  compare  our  model  with previously published studies,  in 
regressions  not  shown  here,  we  substituted CR4  and  CR42  for  HIIEdl.  The 
estimated coefficients were  significantly different  from  zero at the  5% 
level or better and  were  positive  and  negative,  respectively.  The 
models  with  HIIEdl  reported  in this  paper  had  considerably higher  coef-
ficients  of  determination.  Moreover,  higher t-values  for the coef-
ficient of  ADBFS  suggest that  for  previous  structure-performance models 
that omitted  Ed'  the variation  in advertising-to-sales ratios may  have 
been partially confounded with variation in the omitted  Ed' 
10  This  model  has  specified ADBFS  and  TVAD  as  independent,  additive terms, 
partly because  our theoretical model  specifies advertising intensity 
only  and  partly  from  the belief that the determinants  of  advertising II 
12 
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intensity are distinct  from  those that drive the advertising mix. 
However,  the two  advertising variables might  act  interactively.  In 
regression  runs  not  shown  here,  we  replaced  ADBFS  and  TVAD  with 
18 
ADBFS  *  TVAD.  The  results were  not  encouraging.  The t-statistic for 
ADBFS  *  TVAD  was  high  enough  (3.68  to 4.97),  but there was  pronounced 
collinearity with  several other variables  in the model. 
Most  previous  regression analyses  of the market  structure determinants 
of price-cost margins  in  food  manufacturing  have  employed  GEOG  [Connor, 
et al.  1985:337J,  'even  though  it may  have  been misspecified as  an 
additive shifter.  An  alternate measure  of  geographic  market  size has 
been  suggested  by  Weiss  [1972J.  We  calculate the average  radius that 
accounted  for  80%  of  tonnage  shipped  in  1977  from  various  food  manufac-
turing plants  (MILES)  [Connor  1983:143-47J.  In  regressions  not  shown 
in the present paper,  we  replaced the variable  H  *  GEOG  with  H  *  MILES. 
Although  H  *  MILES  is conceptually  superior to  H  *  GEOG,  collinearity 
with other  independent  variables  in our  sample  (especially H  *  CONS  and 
GR07782)  drastically reduced  its explanatory  power  [Connor  and  Peterson 
1991,  Appendix  Table  6J. 
Sample  and  out-of-sample  means  for  the  independent  variables  are  shown 
in Appendix  Table  7  of  Connor  and  Peterson  [1991J.  The  sampled  classes 
are very  similar  for  both years.  However,  compared to nonsampled 
classes~ the  sampled  classes are  more  concentrated,  more  inelastic, 
more  heavily advertised,  have  larger scale economies,  and  (by  construc-
tion)  smaller  shares  of private  label products. 
We  attempted to test our  model  against  1979-1980  wholesale-level price 
differences  developed  for  the authors  by  Robert  Wills.  For  reasons  we 
do  not  fully  comprehend,  these data fit our  model  very poorly.  Only 
37%  of the variation in price-cost margins  is explained by the  same 
independent variables used  in Equation  (2).  The  small  sample  size 
(N  =  26)  may  be  responsible. AUTHORS 
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